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ELIZABETH F. EMENS*
Disabling Attitudes: U.S. Disability Law and the
ADA Amendments Act†
This is a crucial juncture for U.S. disability law. In 2008, Con-
gress passed the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), which aims to
reverse the courts’ narrowing interpretations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990. This legislative intervention provides an im-
portant lens through which to consider attitudes toward disability,
both because the success of the ADAAA will depend on judicial atti-
tudes, and because the changes rendered by the ADAAA shed light on
pervasive societal attitudes. This Essay makes three main points.
First, the ADAAA intervenes in the developing doctrine on disability
discrimination in important ways; in so doing, however, the ADAAA
carves up the definition of disability, for the first time distinguishing
“actual disability” from “regarded as disability,” and expressly reserv-
ing the right to accommodation for “actual disability.” This move
repudiates a strong form of the social model of disability and accedes
to a hierarchy of discrimination that treats the failure to accommo-
date as a different and lesser form of bias than direct discrimination.
Second, and less prominently, the ADAAA introduces an express ban
on reverse discrimination claims. Though the provision is arguably
positive on a practical level, the fact that this provision could pass
without protest—at a time when reverse discrimination claims on the
basis of sex and race have become increasingly prominent and legiti-
mate—sets into relief the low status of disability in the popular
imagination. Finally, the expanded definition of “disability” under the
ADAAA, though useful for many potential plaintiffs, may have unan-
ticipated attitudinal consequences. As the class of those who count as
disabled grows, a legal buffer is removed between “nondisabled” and
“disabled,” in ways that may increase the existential anxiety of the
nondisabled and result in empathy failures. A key question is how to
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ments on earlier drafts, I thank Samuel Bagenstos, Kevin Barry, Noa Ben-Asher,
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Law class in the Spring of 2011. For excellent research assistance, I thank Laura
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turn existential anxiety about becoming disabled into an appreciation
of disability law as a social insurance policy for everyone. Efforts to
improve attitudes toward disability will be critical in the coming
years, as anticipated by the awareness-raising Article 8 of the UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
INTRODUCTION
This is a fascinating and uncertain time for U.S. disability law.
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
which prohibits discrimination (including the failure to accommo-
date) in employment, public accommodations, and government
services.1 For nearly two decades, the courts narrowed the scope of
the ADA’s mandate by, most obviously, interpreting “disability”
under the ADA in a restrictive manner.2 In 2008, Congress passed
the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA),3 which attempts to restore a
broader vision of the original ADA by, in particular, expanding the
statutory definition of disability.4 Courts so far have had limited oc-
casions to interpret the revised language.5 The question now looms as
to whether that broader vision will survive the courts.
Attitudes to disability determined the fate of the ADA in the
nearly twenty years between its passage and its restoration. It was
largely attitudes—specifically, the gap between societal attitudes and
the law’s demands—that led to the narrowing of the statute in the
courts.6 The ADA had impressive bipartisan support,7 but it seems
likely that those who voted for it had rather different reasons for do-
ing so: combine a few who understand disability as a civil rights
issue, with those who see it through the lens of pity, with those eco-
nomically minded folks who see it as a way to get people off of welfare
and onto the tax rolls, and you get the ADA.8 When the ADA reached
the courts, judges interpreted it more narrowly than the advocates
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990).
2. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Dis-
crimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2000).
3. Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.).
4. See id. § 12101 (ADAAA findings).
5. See infra note 11 (explaining that the statute is not being applied R
retroactively).
6. Sam Bagenstos may be right that there are competing visions of disability
rights at work in the ADA, and that they come out of tensions in the disability rights
movement itself, but that kind of internal tension is not unique to disability, and so
we might ask whether the fault truly lies at the movement’s doorstep. See SAMUEL
BAGENSTOS, LAW & THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009).
7. See, e.g., JOSEPH SHAPIRO, NO PITY 118–19 (1993).
8. For more sustained treatment of the ADA’s passage, see, for example, id.; Sa-
muel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 921 (2003).
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expected.9 The law was out ahead of common sense (the common
sense of society, and thus of most legislators and judges), and so
courts did what they often do in such moments: they narrowed the
law to better fit their common sense.10
Now we wait to see what will happen with the ADAAA. It has
been more than two years since it went into effect, but courts have
interpreted it not to apply retroactively.11 The challenged discrimina-
tion in a case therefore must have occurred since the ADAAA for its
revisions to apply. So there is not yet much case law.12 What will
happen as more courts interpret it? My guess is that attitudes to dis-
ability will largely determine the courts’ interpretations. That is, I
suspect that courts will find new ways to narrow the statute, to the
extent that a broader mandate still does not comport with their atti-
tudes to disability—with their common sense.13
What is that common sense about disability? That disability is
unfortunate, even tragic, costly for employers and for society, to be
avoided at most costs and accommodated only at a very limited cost.
That disability cannot possibly have benefits (to the person with the
disability or those around her), and likewise that accommodations
9. Some have argued that the advocates lack a coherent civil rights vision. Sam
Bagenstos is most associated with this position, see BAGENSTOS, supra note 6, but R
other scholars have recognized the tensions in the movement, see, e.g., Michael Ashley
Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 626-29 (2004).
10. The language in the original statute arguably opened itself up to that narrow-
ing, which the drafters of the ADA did not recognize because the same definition in an
earlier statute had not been interpreted narrowly—or received much scrutiny—from
courts. See Feldblum, supra note 2, at 91-92, 113; see also infra note 34 and accompa- R
nying text (quoting the ADA’s definition of disability and discussing its adoption).
Note also that judges’ views are of course more varied and complicated than this cur-
sory rendering of their “common sense” would suggest. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein,
David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Ap-
peals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV., 301, 321 (2004) (finding that
political party (of the appointing president) predicts notably different voting patterns
for judges deciding ADA cases, and that these differences are accentuated by the pres-
ence of other judges appointed by presidents of the same party).
11. See, e.g., Milholland v. Sumner County Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 562 (6th Cir.
2009); Becerril v. Pima County Assessor’s Office, 587 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2009); Lytes
v. DC Water and Sewer Authority, 572 F.3d 936 (D.C. Cir. 2009). See, e.g., Milholland
v. Sumner County Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2009); Becerril v. Pima County
Assessor’s Office, 587 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2009); Lytes v. DC Water and Sewer Au-
thority, 572 F.3d 936 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Cf. Jenkins v. National Bd. of Med. Examiners,
2009 WL 331638 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009) (applying the ADAAA to a case filed before
the ADAAA went into effect because the relief sought was injunctive).
12. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Carefirst of Fort Wayne, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-251, 2010 WL
3522573 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 31, 2010) (applying the ADAAA to find that a plaintiff whose
renal cell carcinoma was in remission was disabled); Horgan v. Simmons, No. 09 C
6796, 2010 WL 1434317 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2010) (applying the ADAAA to conclude
that “major bodily functions” included “functions of the immune system” and that, on
that basis, an HIV-positive plaintiff was disabled).
13. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights
Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19 (2000).
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only benefit the individual who requests them.14 Disability is, in this
view, something we should keep hoping will eventually just go away
if science gets good enough.15 In the meantime, this view might say,
“we” (the nondisabled people, or sometimes just “people”) should be
good enough, moral enough, to do some things to help disabled peo-
ple, but not too much, as of course we would not want to drag down
society or the economy.16
And that is just the beginning. The previous paragraph is proba-
bly a fair characterization of attitudes to the more popular and more
visible forms of disability—relatively speaking—such as paraplegia.
My use of the word “popular” here is only slightly sarcastic; it is no
coincidence that a person in a wheelchair is the symbol for disabled
parking, restrooms, and so forth. The more popular disabilities are
those things (like paraplegia) that apparently affect only a discrete
part of a person.  Notwithstanding the “spread” effect—whereby out-
siders raise their voices at blind people or assume a wheelchair
signals cognitive disability17—nondisabled people are generally more
open to the idea of competence in a person with a discrete disability.
Because the disability occupies one identifiable part of the body, out-
siders can begin to imagine how that person in a wheelchair might be
very talented in the rest of his being, and therefore, from this troub-
ling perspective, worthwhile.
When the conversation turns to people with cognitive or
psychosocial (psychiatric) disabilities, however, then the whole per-
son is tainted, discredited (in Goffman’s terms18) in a wholly different
(and differently whole) way. Many people—disabled and nondisabled
alike—seem not even to know that discrimination against people with
psychiatric disabilities is (presumptively) illegal.19 Imagine here the
lawyer-employer who says he recently hired a new secretary who had
a good resume, even though she seemed “crazy,” because the law says
he cannot discriminate on the basis of psychiatric disability, whether
real or regarded-as. A friend of the employer might well respond,
“Are you crazy?,” once again invoking that common epithet. And hid-
den physical disabilities are often not believed, I think, in ways that
14. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839
(2008).
15. Cf. MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER
REEVE & THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS (2003).
16. On that “we,” see infra text accompanying note 78. R
17. See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF
INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 25 (1983).
18. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA (1963).
19. I say presumptively because there are defenses, such as someone’s inability to
perform the essential functions of her job, or her posing a direct threat to others in the
workplace—the same defenses available for physical disabilities.
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should perhaps not surprise us, after Elaine Scarry’s insights about
our inability to apprehend, or even believe, another’s pain.20
Attitudes to disability therefore may lead to courts’ finding new
ways to narrow the ADA’s protections, now that the ADAAA limits
the ways that they can define the protected class narrowly.21 This is
therefore a crucial juncture for examining attitudes to disability and
their intersection with this evolving law. This Article therefore uses
the recent changes introduced by the ADAAA to make a series of
points about attitudes to disability.
A caveat is in order, as this is a fairly gloomy story about what is
clearly an exciting legal development. The ADAAA intervenes in the
developing doctrine on disability discrimination in important ways,
and the passage of this ambitious legislation is all the more impres-
sive in a period characterized more by retrenchment than expansion
of civil rights law.22 My hope is that the ADAAA will expand the
scope of who is protected and who obtains accommodation, through
the many legal and extralegal actors who implement the law on a
daily basis.23 If the ADAAA successfully brings more people with dis-
abilities into the workplace, then attitudes to disability should be
improved through increased contact with a wide range of people with
disabilities and with reasonable accommodations.24  This Essay fo-
20. See ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 4 (1985) (“For the person whose pain it
is, it is ‘effortlessly’ grasped (that is, even with the most heroic effort it cannot not be
grasped); while for the person outside the sufferer’s body, what is ‘effortless’ is not
grasping it (it is easy to remain wholly unaware of its existence; even with effort, one
may remain in doubt about its existence or may retain the astonishing freedom of
denying its existence; and, finally, if with the best effort of sustained attention one
successfully apprehends it, the aversiveness of the ‘it’ one apprehends will only be a
shadowy fraction of the actual ‘it’). So, for the person in pain, so incontestably and
unnegotiably present is it that ‘having pain’ may come to be thought of as the most
vibrant example of what it is to ‘have certainty,’ while for the other person it is so
elusive that ‘hearing about pain’ may exist as the primary model of what it is ‘to have
doubt.’ Thus pain comes unsharably into our midst as at once that which cannot be
denied and that which cannot be confirmed.”). For a critique of some ways of reading
Scarry, see Tobin Siebers, Disability, Pain, and the Politics of Minority Identity (un-
published manuscript, on file with author, Oct. 2011) (“Pain does not spring from and
differentiate the individual. It does not belong to one person alone. It is a social inven-
tion, external to people, that marks them as individual. The dominant social
representation of pain in the West is the individual alone in pain . . . . What would it
mean to conceive of pain not as an individual or personal emotion—as a feeling owned
by one person—but as a socially mediated identity, as a product of social forces oper-
ating external to individuals?”).
21. For ways courts might do this, see infra text accompanying notes 48-51. R
22. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J.
1141 (2002).
23. C.f., e.g., Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic
Change, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2007); 76 Fed. Reg. 16989 (Mar. 25, 2011) (reporting,
as part of the impact analysis of the ADAAA, the argument that accommodations
were being provided more broadly than the court decisions required); id. at 16997-98
(recognizing the potential for attitudinal benefits, inter alia, from accommodation).
24. There is an extensive literature on the so-called contact hypothesis, the idea
that working side by side in cooperative ventures can reduce animus and stereotyp-
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cuses largely on attitudes in direct interaction with the statute,
although the statute’s effects on attitudes will also be mediated by
how the statute is implemented on the ground.  That process of im-
plementation will, however, be shaped by the statute’s fate in the
courts.  My concern is that the persistence of negative and ignorant
attitudes to disability will lead courts to undercut effective imple-
mentation either by defying the clear mandate of the ADAAA to
broaden the scope of coverage or, more likely, by finding new ways to
limit enforcement.25 It is therefore my aim to contribute to our under-
standing of those attitudes, by identifying a number of ways that
they intersect with these recent changes to the law.
From an international perspective, this is also an auspicious mo-
ment to focus on attitudes to disability, in the wake of President
Obama’s signing of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD).26 The CRPD contains an “Awareness-raising”
article explicitly requiring states’ parties to promote more positive at-
titudes toward disability.27 Whether and how states implement this
directive will depend in part on their appreciation of the crucial role
attitudes play in the creation and implementation of disability law.28
At this critical juncture, this essay examines U.S. disability law to
help enrich our understanding of attitudes to disability in the U.S.
context and, I hope, beyond.
I. INTRODUCING THE ADAAA
It is the intent of Congress that the primary object of attention
in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities
covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations
. . . [rather than] whether an individual’s impairment is a
disability under the ADA.
—ADA Amendments Act of 200829
ing. For a discussion in the disability context, see, for example, Samuel R. Bagenstos,
“Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil
Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 843-44 & n.55 (2003).  On the potential third-party bene-
fits of contact with accommodations, see Emens, supra note 14; 76 Fed. Reg. 16997-98 R
(Mar. 25, 2011).
25. See infra notes 48-51. R
26. The question of course remains as to whether the Senate will ratify the CRPD.
27. See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106,
art. 8 (2007) [hereinafter CRPD].
28. On the hope that this article will be implemented, and on the CRPD more
generally, see Michael Ashley Stein & Janet E. Lord, Future Prospects for the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in THE UN CONVEN-
TION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSON WITH DISABILITIES: EUROPEAN AND SCANDINAVIAN
PERSPECTIVES 17 (Gerard Quinn & Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir eds., 2009).
29. ADAAA, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
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The ADAAA expressly aims to “carry out the ADA’s objectives
. . . by reinstating a broad scope of protection.”30 In important ways,
the statute has made a bold attempt to fulfill this aim; in other ways,
however, the ADAAA compromises the boldest structural aspect of
the statute, fundamentally altering its idea of disability and of dis-
crimination. To understand these moves, we have to take a step back
and briefly describe relevant aspects of the ADA, the courts’ narrow-
ing, and the ADAAA’s intervention.31
The ADA protects against discrimination on the basis of “disabil-
ity,”32 so a plaintiff has to qualify as having a “disability” to bring a
claim under the statute. Under the ADA, before the amendments, the
definition of “disability” was as follows:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially lim-
its one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.33
Various work documents the reasons why the proponents of the law
did not think these definitional prongs would be interpreted nar-
rowly; most importantly, this language was lifted out of a previous
law—the Rehabilitation Act of 1973—and had not been given a re-
strictive interpretation.34
When courts began hearing ADA cases, however, they inter-
preted this definition of disability strictly in (at least) five ways.
First, and broadly, the Supreme Court expressly declared that a “de-
manding standard” should be applied to determinations of whether a
plaintiff fit the definition of “disability” under the statute.35 Second,
consistent with this, courts interpreted “substantially limiting” re-
strictively, requiring plaintiffs to show that they were really really
limited in a major life activity to count as disabled. This approach led
to notorious losses for plaintiffs36—many enumerated in the legisla-
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
31. For more comprehensive treatments, see, for example, Kevin Barry, Toward
Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act Can and Can’t Do for Disability
Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203 (2010); Alex B. Long, Introducing the New
and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of
2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217 (2008).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The language of this provision was also modified by the
ADAAA. See infra note 101.
33.  This was 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
34. See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 2, at 91-92; Barry, supra note 31. The language R
came from Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibited discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability by employers who received federal funds.
35. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
36. ADA plaintiffs had been losing 97% of their employment discrimination cases.
See Amy L. Albright, 2009 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey Up-
date, 34 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 339, 340 (2010).
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tive history of the ADAAA and in various law review articles—for
instance, the plaintiff whose cancer was posthumously declared not
limiting enough.37 Third, and, again, relatedly, the Supreme Court
held that, since “substantially limited” is in the present tense, plain-
tiffs who have mitigated their disabilities must be considered in their
mitigated state; thus, a person who has successfully mitigated was
excluded from protection under the statute.38 This also led to some
troubling results.39 Fourth, courts applied a restrictive view of what
counted as “major life activities.”40 Fifth, in a range of ways, courts
interpreted the third prong—the “regarded as” prong—of the defini-
tion of disability restrictively. Most notably, they required plaintiffs
to prove not only the impairment the employer regarded them as hav-
ing, but to prove precisely what major life activity the employer
regarded them as substantially limited in.41 Picture plaintiffs at-
tempting to show that their employers were—lying awake at
night?—imagining exactly how their employees’ impairments limited
them and in what activities. Absurd.42
The ADAAA addresses most of these problems with the courts’
treatment of the definition of disability. The findings explicitly reject
the “demanding” standard, as well as the highly restrictive interpre-
tations of the “substantially limited” language.43 The statute
expressly indicates that plaintiffs are to be considered without regard
to the ameliorating effects of any mitigating measures (other than
ordinary eye glasses or contact lenses).44 The ADAAA gives “major
life activity” a clearer and broader scope, by providing an illustrative
37. See, e.g., Long, supra note 31, at 218 (citing Hirsch v. National Mall & Serv., R
Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Ill. 1997)); see also, e.g., ADAAA, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008)
(noting that Supreme Court cases such as Sutton and Toyota “have narrowed the
broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating protec-
tion for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect” and that, “as a result of
these Supreme Court cases, lower courts have incorrectly found in individual cases
that people with a range of substantially limiting impairments are not people with
disabilities”); Feldblum, supra note 2, at 148-57. R
38. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
39. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 31, at 246 (citing examples). R
40. See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. 17007.
41. And if that major life activity was working, they also needed to show that they
were regarded as limited in working at a class of jobs. See Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
42. Indeed, Jill Anderson has cleverly shown how this was largely an absurd in-
terpretation of the statute not only as a practical matter, but as a technical
syntactical manner, such that revision of this part of the statute should not have been
necessary to eliminate this particular demand for proof, if courts were as attentive to
linguistic technicalities as they like to think that they are. Jill Anderson, Just Seman-
tics: The Lost Readings of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992
(2008).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(4). Neither the statute nor the subsequent regulations
give precise meaning to the “substantially limited” language, but the regulations lay
out nine interpretive rules that make plain the broadening of the standard. 76 Fed.
Reg. 16978, 17000-01 (Mar. 25, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(j)(1)).
44. 42 U.S.C. 12102(4)(E).
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list, and by introducing “the operation of a major bodily function”
(also with an illustrative list) as another form of major life activity.45
Perhaps most strikingly, for the regarded-as prong, the statute com-
pletely removes the need to show any substantial limitation in a
major life activity. So long as a plaintiff shows that she has been
“subjected to an action prohibited under this Act because of an actual
or perceived physical or mental impairment” (that is not both minor
and transitory), she qualifies for coverage under the regarded-as
prong.46
Though these changes are not comprehensive, they are ambi-
tious.47 I nonetheless worry that courts will find new ways to limit
the scope of the statute’s protections. How might they do that? Courts
could continue to interpret “substantially limits” somewhat narrowly,
since the final statute and the regulations abandoned any attempt to
define it.48 However, this approach would directly contravene the
ADAAA’s express rejection of a “demanding standard” for interpret-
ing “substantially limits,” as well as the regulations’ nine rules of
construction. Courts could, instead, put more pressure on the evi-
dence required to demonstrate an “impairment.” For at least some
conditions, this could turn into a highly medicalized inquiry.49 This
would, more generally, run up against the statute’s explicit mandate
that courts shift their emphasis from determining who is in and who
is out to determining whether discrimination has occurred.
As the statutory findings indicate, “it is the intent of Congress
that the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA
should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (“In general . . . , major life activities include, but
are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eat-
ing, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning,
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working”); id. § 2(B) (“For pur-
poses of paragraph (1), a major life activity also includes the operation of a major
bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal
cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, en-
docrine, and reproductive functions.”).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). “Transitory” is defined as having “an actual or ex-
pected duration of 6 months or less.” Id. § 12102(3)(B).
47. The statute neglects to address directly any issues outside the scope of the
definition of disability, as well as issues such as the narrow interpretations courts
have given to the “record of” prong. See, e.g., Long, supra note 31, at 227. The EEOC R
implies that the statute’s demand for lesser scrutiny of “disability,” alongside the
Commission’s own broader interpretation of “record of,” will address the doctrinal
problems with the “record of” prong. 76 Fed. Reg. 16984 (Mar. 25, 2011). The EEOC
also makes clear its position that “record of” plaintiffs are entitled to accommodation,
a point of ambiguity in the statutory text that will presumably provide fodder to
courts. Id.
48. 76 Fed. Reg. 16981.
49. Although the emphasis of the literature critiquing courts’ interpretations of
the ADA has focused on the “substantially limiting” and “major life activity,” some
work suggests that courts have also put pressure on impairment. See Deirdre M.
Smith, Who Says You’re Disabled? The Role of Medical Evidence in the ADA Defini-
tion of Disability, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1 (2007).
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with their obligations . . . . [T]he question of whether an individual’s
impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand exten-
sive analysis.”50 The ADAAA should therefore put pressure on courts
to decide who is “otherwise qualified” to do various jobs, what is “rea-
sonable” accommodation, and what is an “undue hardship” that
exempts an employer from providing a requested accommodation.51
As a result, courts should direct more attention to these questions,
and so those courts inclined to keep the scope of the statute limited
may interpret these provisions restrictively.
II. CARVING UP THE DEFINITION OF DISABILITY: ABANDONING A
RADICAL SOCIAL MODEL
[A] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others
toward such impairment.
—EEOC, Regulations interpreting “regarded as”
disability52
Broadly speaking, the ADAAA’s move towards a more expansive
definition of “disability” is consistent with a social model—the idea
that disability inheres in the interaction between impairment and
the surrounding social world, rather than being an individual medi-
cal problem.53 The ADAAA reflects the social model through its shift
in emphasis from just how limited the individual with a disability is,
to what happened (discrimination?) or what should happen (accom-
modation?) in interaction with the disability.54
Structurally, however, the ADAAA moves away from the social
model. It carves up the definition of disability under the ADA, limit-
ing certain types of discrimination claims, and certain types of
remedies, to certain categories of disability. One of the ADA’s boldest
features—at least in principle—was that the statute defined disabil-
ity to include both actual and regarded–as-disability, with both
counting equally as disability for all purposes under the statute, in-
cluding accommodation. The ADAAA does away with that, as I shall
explain.
50. ADAAA, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
51. See generally Barry, supra note 31; Long, supra note 31. R
52. 29 CFR § 1630.2(l)(2).
53. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86
VA. L. REV. 397, 428–33 (2000); see also MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY
30–42 (1996). For useful critical perspectives on the social model, see, for example,
TOM SHAKESPEARE, DISABILITY RIGHTS AND WRONGS 29, 29–53 (2006); Vlad Perju, Im-
pairment, Discrimination, and the Legal Construction of Disability in the European
Union and the United States, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 279 (2011).
54. See supra text accompanying note 50. R
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Recall the ADA’s definition of disability quoted above.55 All three
of the prongs counted equally as having a “disability.” In principle,
those who fell under the statute by virtue of actually having an im-
pairment that substantially limited them in a major life activity, and
those who fell under it by virtue of being regarded as such, had the
same claim to protection, including accommodation, under the ADA.
(As I shall discuss in a moment, courts worked hard to say otherwise,
but nothing in the statute supported their position.56)
This alignment of actually disabled and regarded-as disabled
under a single rubric presents a fairly radical version of the social
model of disability. Other legal instruments embrace the social
model,57 but the ADA was unusual in explicitly putting disability cre-
ated by others’ perception on a structural par with disability created
by otherwise-limiting impairment.58
By contrast, the ADAAA carves up the ADA’s old definition in
ways that broaden the scope of the statute’s protection—a much
needed development—but that also create two distinct types of disa-
bility, now with different legal protections and remedies. The ADAAA
largely leaves the definition of disability as it was, but then it adds a
qualifying phrase to the third prong, so that it reads as follows: “(C)
being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in para-
graph (3).”59 The paragraph referenced goes on to explain, as I noted
above, that the “regarded as” prong now requires less than before: a
plaintiff counts as regarded-as having a disability if she was sub-
jected to an action prohibited under this statute “because of an actual
or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the im-
pairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”60 So far,
so good. This part is a significant improvement, in light of the ridicu-
lous (and linguistically inapt61) contortions courts were asking
regarded-as plaintiffs to make.
55. See supra text accompanying note 33. R
56. See infra note 62. R
57. See, e.g., CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 1 (“Persons with disabilities include R
those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments
which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective partici-
pation in society on an equal basis with others.”); Stein & Lord, supra note 28, at 25 R
(reading this definition to “firmly ground[ ] the disability classification in the social
model of disability”).
58. Protecting perceived-as discrimination is not unique, however; the UK’s
Equality Act of 2010 is an example of a jurisdiction that offers protection to those
perceived to have a protected trait. The Equality Bill, available at http://www.legisla
tion.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/contents; http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200
910/ldbills/020/en/2010020en.pdf; see also http://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?article
id=3017.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (emphasis added).
60. Id. § 12102(3)(A).
61. See supra note 42. R
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The problem in the ADAAA comes with the later introduction of
an exception to the contexts in which plaintiffs are entitled to
accommodations:
(h) REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS AND MODIFICA-
TIONS.—A covered entity . . . need not provide a reasonable
accommodation or a reasonable modification to policies,
practices, or procedures to an individual who meets the defi-
nition of disability in section 3(1) solely under subparagraph
(C) of such section.
In other words, plaintiffs who are only “regarded as” disabled have no
right to accommodation.
The idea that the statute ever required employers to accommo-
date those who are regarded-as disabled may sound absurd—as it did
to some courts62—but it was not entirely so, for several reasons.
First, if one accepts a social model of disability,63 then an employer’s
regarding the employee as substantially limited in a major life activ-
ity could warrant accommodation. This sounds less surprising if one
remembers that courts had imposed a narrow conception of who
counted as disabled under the “actual disability” prong. Thus, some-
one might have a limiting impairment but not count as substantially
limited enough to qualify for ADA protection. In such a case, the fact
that the employer regards the person as substantially limited enough
would reasonably entitle the person to whatever accommodations
might help him do his job better. Such cases should, however, become
less frequent under the ADAAA, with its broadened protection for the
“actually disabled” prong.
Second, one can imagine a plaintiff who is actually disabled, and
also regarded-as disabled, and who would prefer to make a claim
under the regarded-as prong. As various scholars have pointed out,
the ADA puts plaintiffs in a bind: they must prove both that they are
substantially limited enough to count as disabled, and that they are
nonetheless capable enough to be “otherwise qualified” to perform the
essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion.64 The requirement that plaintiffs under the actually disabled
prong put on evidence to prove just how limited they really are might
be unappealing to some plaintiffs, not just for problems of proof, but
62. See, e.g., Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir.
2003) (“[T]o conclude that ‘regarded as’ plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable accommo-
dation . . . would be a perverse and troubling result.”); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186
F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Imposing liability on employers who fail to accommo-
date non-disabled employees who are simply regarded as disabled would lead to
bizarre results.”).
63. See supra text accompanying note 53. R
64. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)-(b)(5)(A) (2000).
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also for what it means to them to perform their limitations in court.65
One might think here of literary scholar Stephen Greenblatt’s story
about refusing a fellow airplane passenger’s request to mouth the
words “I want to die”; Greenblatt felt it was too dangerous to form
those words, even as a brief favor to a stranger, in light of the ways
that our performances become us.66 Going into court to prove that
someone else thought you were substantially limited, yet refused to
accommodate your (perceived) limitation, might be preferable to go-
ing into court to prove just how limited you really are. This problem
should also be lessened by the expanded scope of the actual-disability
prong, although it will not be eliminated.
Third, sometimes others’ attitudes are precisely what is disa-
bling about a particular condition. Think here of facial scarring or a
missing front tooth.67 The reactions of others might make working or
interacting with those affected difficult, even if neither condition cre-
ates any functional limitations. Indeed, the EEOC’s regulations
interpreting the regarded-as prong envisioned this prong applying,
inter alia, to people who are “substantially limited only as a result of
the attitudes of others.”68 Accommodations in such cases could in-
clude less interaction with customers, for instance, though one might
worry about the segregating or stigmatizing meaning of such a mea-
sure. Requesting a non-commission-based sales job might be a
65. See, e.g., Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability
Rights Litigation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 247, 302-04; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos &
Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 745, 785-87 (2007).
66. The other passenger was going to visit an ailing relative, and so wanted to
make sure that he knew what it would look like for a person to mouth those words.
See STEPHEN GREENBLATT, Epilogue, RENAISSANCE SELF-FASHIONING 255-56 (1983) (“I
felt superstitiously that if I mimed the man’s terrible sentence, it would have the
force, as it were, of a legal sentence, that the words would stick like a burr upon me.
And beyond superstition, I was aware, in a manner more forceful than anything my
academic research had brought home to me, of the extent to which my identity and
the words I utter coincide, the extent to which I want to form my own sentences or to
choose for myself those moments in which I will recite someone else’s.”).
67. Cf., e.g., 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B (2010) (discussing the example of someone
with severe burns). Another example, under a regime that took mitigation into ac-
count for determining actual disability (as was the case before the ADAAA and after
Sutton v. United Air Lines), would be a highly stigmatized condition, such as schizo-
phrenia, that has been effectively treated with medication. See, e.g., ELYN R. SAKS,
THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD (2007) (discussing issues of disclosure in the context of job
interviews, in relation to schizophrenia).
68. 29 CFR § 1630.2(l)(2). When discussing the regarded-as prong in Sutton v.
United Air Lines, the Supreme Court omitted this interpretation of the regarded-as
prong, opting instead to read the regarded-as prong as concerned with mistakes of
fact—that is, employers who think an employee has a substantially limiting impair-
ment when she has no impairment, or who think an employee’s impairment is
substantially limiting when it is not. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
489 (1999). This was, however, dicta.
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reasonable accommodation that would not raise these problems to
the same extent.69
These scenarios are irrelevant under the ADAAA. Regarded-as
plaintiffs no longer have any statutory right to accommodation. They
are in their own category, distinct from the real disabled, and with a
limited set of rights and remedies. Indeed, the interpretive regula-
tions recently issued by the EEOC explicitly distinguish between
“actual disability” and “regarded as disability,” although they accom-
pany these terms with a disclaimer that these terms are for “ease of
reference only.”70 The statute itself does not employ these terms, and
both types still fall equally under the definition of “disability,”71 but
the difference in remedies suggests to me a difference in the underly-
ing categories. Even if the practical consequences are limited, this
structural disavowal of a more radical social model is disappointing
as a conceptual matter.72
69. Cf. EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 839 F. 2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing
types of commissioned and non-commissioned sales jobs).
70. See 76 Fed. Reg. 16980 (Mar. 25, 2011) (“For clarity, the Commission has re-
ferred to the first prong as ‘actual disability,’ to distinguish it from the second prong
(‘record of’) and the third prong (‘regarded as’).”). The disclaimer succeeds in high-
lighting the significance of the change to the statute that requires this act of naming:
The terminology selected is for ease of reference and is not intended to sug-
gest that individuals with a disability under the first prong otherwise have
any greater rights under the ADA than individuals whose impairments are
covered under the “record of” or “regarded as” prongs, other than the restric-
tion created by the Amendments Act that individuals covered only under the
“regarded as” prong are not entitled to reasonable accommodation.
See id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); see supra text accompanying notes 59-60. R
72. Scholars involved in the ADAAA’s creation, echoing the legislative history,
acknowledge this structural change to the regarded-as prong as a “compromise” nec-
essary to passing the statute’s very expansive understanding of “regarded as.” See,
e.g., 154 CONG. REC. S8842 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (“[This] is an acceptable compro-
mise given our strong expectation that such individuals would now be covered under
the first prong of the definition [of disability], properly applied.”); 76 Fed. Reg. 17015
(Mar. 25, 2011) (quoting this language with approval); Barry, supra note 31 (same). R
The expanded regarded-as prong aims to bring the ADA closer to the model of other
civil rights legislation that protects everyone along particular axes of identity. Kevin
Barry characterizes the revised ADA as harmonizing a universal (social) model of dis-
ability (under the regarded-as prong) with a minority-group (social) model of
disability (under the actual-disability prong). See Barry, supra note 31, at 278-79. R
This is an appealing way of thinking about the statute, but it does not eliminate the
structural implications of creating distinct categories of disability with different defi-
nitions of discrimination.  Moreover, if accommodations are “at the root of most ADA
employment cases,” as Barry notes, then it is unclear how far this harmonization can
go. See id. at 278 (citing James Leonard, The Equity Trap: How Reliance on Tradi-
tional Civil Rights Concepts Has Rendered Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1, 23 (2005)).
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III. DISTINGUISHING ACCOMMODATION FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION
[T]he normal definition of discrimination—differential treat-
ment of similarly situated groups.
—Justice Kennedy73
The ADA defines “discriminate” to “include[ ] . . . not making rea-
sonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.”74 A failure to
accommodate is discrimination under the ADA. And yet, I have stu-
dents writing on disability issues who use the word discriminate as
something clearly (to them) distinct from failure to accommodate,
without remembering (despite our class discussions) that this is a
contested issue.
Much scholarly energy has been spent debating this question: Is
the ADA doing something really different from the rest (or the heart)
of antidiscrimination law, or is it doing something fundamentally
similar? Scholars have labored to identify the many ways that core
U.S. antidiscrimination statutes—like Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964—and even our core types of discrimination claims—espe-
cially disparate impact, but also, at times, disparate treatment—
involve costs to the employer and changes to policies and practices
that operate like accommodation.75 The work in this area is interest-
ing and well done, but a final resolution is unlikely, because
ultimately it seems that both sides have some merit. Much in Title
VII requires employers to absorb costs and change certain policies
and practices to avoid violating the antidiscrimination mandate of
the statute, making it not so different from the ADA along the com-
monly cited axis of cost. But the obligation that employers respond to
individual requests by employees to change their practices—even if
those changes might operate like the remedies in a disparate impact
suit, and even if those changes are sometimes costless or even benefi-
73. Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 614 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The
context includes Kennedy’s observation,
Discrimination, of course, tends to be an expansive concept and, as legal cate-
gory, it must be applied with care and prudence . . . . To establish
discrimination in the context of this case, and absent a showing of policies
motivated by improper animus or stereotypes, it would be necessary to show
that a comparable or similarly situated group received differential
treatment.
Id. at 613.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b).
75. Compare, e.g., Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001); Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference:
ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004); Bagen-
stos, supra note 24; with Amy L. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity, and “Real Efficiency”: A R
Unified Approach, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1421 (2003); Pamela S. Karlan & George
Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation 46 DUKE
L.J. 1 (1996).
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cial to employers—requires a different kind of interaction between
employer and employee on the front end. Thus, some things are dif-
ferent, and some are similar. But the question of whether the failure
to accommodate is discrimination has now become more interesting
because the ADAAA provides two different meanings of “discrimi-
nate”—one for actually disabled plaintiffs and another for regarded-
as disabled plaintiffs, as discussed above.
Justice Kennedy makes clear his view that the ADA is doing
something different, in his concurring opinions in two crucial cases,
Olmstead76 and Garrett,77 handed down one year apart. The epigraph
above from Olmstead—“the normal definition of discrimination [is]
differential treatment of similarly situated groups”—nicely captures
his basic view of discrimination. Thus understood, it does not include
the failure to accommodate, something he makes clear in these deci-
sions, as he contrasts that with some of the newfangled concepts in
this arena. In Garrett, Kennedy grapples with the changing times.
Here is what he tells us about evolving concepts of “prejudice”:
Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, rises not from
malice or hostile animus alone. It may result as well from
insensitivity caused by simple want of careful, rational re-
flection or from some instinctive mechanism to guard
against people who appear to be different in some respects
from ourselves. Quite apart from any historical documenta-
tion, knowledge of our own human instincts teaches that
persons who find it difficult to perform routine functions by
reason of some mental or physical impairment might at first
seem unsettling to us, unless we are guided by the better
angels of our nature. There can be little doubt, then, that
persons with mental or physical impairments are confronted
with prejudice which can stem from indifference or insecu-
rity as well as from malicious ill will.78
In short, traditional prejudice arises from malice or hostile animus,
but there are other more natural emotions and behaviors—“instinc-
tive mechanisms”—that may lead us to behave in ways that “the
better angels of our nature” would discourage. “Our” nature, Ken-
nedy tells us, is to be “unsettled” by people with disabilities.
But law can help: “One of the undoubted achievements of stat-
utes designed to assist those with impairments is that citizens have
an incentive, flowing from a legal duty, to develop a better under-
standing, a more decent perspective, for accepting persons with
76.  Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 614 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
77. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 375 (2000)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 374-75.
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impairments or disabilities into the larger society.”79 The ADA is a
good thing, Kennedy says, because it will get us “citizens” to accept
those “persons with impairments or disabilities” into our society.
This is apparently a reason to praise the ADA—as “a milestone
on the path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive society”—but it is
not sufficient to make the law enforceable.80 The forms of prejudice
that involve “the failure to act or the omission to remedy” just are not
enough to enforce the law against the states:
It is a question of quite a different order, however, to say
that the States in their official capacities, the States as gov-
ernmental entities, must be held in violation of the
Constitution on the assumption that they embody the mis-
conceived or malicious perceptions of some of their citizens.
It is a most serious charge to say a State has engaged in a
pattern or practice designed to deny its citizens the equal
protection of the laws, particularly where the accusation is
based not on hostility but instead on the failure to act or the
omission to remedy . . . .81
Thus, Kennedy concludes, “[t]he failure of a State to revise policies
now seen as incorrect under a new understanding of proper policy
does not always constitute the purposeful and intentional action re-
quired to make out a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”82
In this opinion, Kennedy makes clear his view that our learning
process about “prejudice” is as much a hierarchy of types of prejudice
as it is a progression over time to greater understanding. With disa-
bility, we are not really talking about discrimination. We are talking
about charity, perhaps, or some other (Christian?) virtue typified by
our “better angels” and contrary to our “human instincts.” With disa-
bility, we are not talking about the kind of bad actors for whom we
(should) reserve the word discrimination.
And now the ADAAA says that actually-disabled people have one
definition of discrimination—which includes the failure to accommo-
date—whereas people who are only “regarded as” disabled have
another definition of discrimination—which does not include the fail-
ure to accommodate. In this way, the ADAAA has conceded
something to the accommodation-is-different camp. Although the
statute still formally includes actually disabled and regarded-as dis-
abled within the definition of disability, the legal entitlements for
79. Id. at 375.
80. Id. (“The law works this way because the law can be a teacher. So I do not
doubt that the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 will be a milestone on the path
to a more decent, tolerant, progressive society.”) (emphasis added).
81. Id. (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
82. Id.
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each group are now substantially different. This kind of move is not
unique to the U.S. context.83
Some scholars offer a more optimistic account of the ADAAA’s
reconstruction of the regarded-as prong. For instance, one might read
the regarded-as prong as “signal[ing] long-awaited parity between
the ADA and other civil rights laws . . . [b]y defining ‘disability’ to
include just about everyone on the continuum of impairments.”84 In-
deed, the regulations present the regarded-as prong as the first port
of call for plaintiffs who do not challenge a failure to accommodate.85
This new statutory structure plainly incentivizes plaintiffs and their
lawyers to bring suit under the regarded-as prong whenever possible.
Will it also make lawyers less likely to take cases involving the more
difficult, and now severable, accommodation claims?
Presumably at least some plaintiffs’ lawyers will attempt to cast
what would have previously been accommodation claims as antidis-
crimination claims. This raises an interesting conceptual and
practical question: What will happen when courts confront claims of
discrimination that lie on the border of “accommodation”? For in-
stance, is the failure to allow someone with mild depression to arrive
and leave early one day a week to attend therapy a failure to accom-
modate or simple discrimination, if the employer sometimes allows
others to leave early for their children’s sporting events? This is a
classic selective-sympathy problem. Or consider the problem of struc-
tural changes to the workplace: Is the failure to construct accessible
restrooms for the first disabled employees—or, for that matter, wo-
men’s rooms for the first female employees—simple discrimination or
83. This aspect of the ADAAA resembles the way the United Kingdom imple-
mented the EU Framework Employment Directive, which contains no “justification”
defense, to the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA), which did; the response was to
remove the “justification” defense only for “ ‘pure’ direct discrimination” claims, leav-
ing the defense in place for indirect discrimination claims under the DDA. See Sandra
Fredman, Disability Equality: A Challenge to the Existing Anti-Discrimination Para-
digm, in DISABILITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 199, 200 (Anna
Lawson & Caroline Gooding eds., 2005). The law of Washington state was the model
for the ADAAA’s bifurcated structure, though Washington’s law differs in significant
respects. See Barry, supra note 31, at 266; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 49.60.040(7) R
(West 2010) (defining “disability” as “the presence of a sensory, mental, or physical
impairment that . . . [i]s medically cognizable or diagnosable,” but requiring that, in
order to qualify for a reasonable accommodation, the impairment “must be known or
shown through an interactive process to exist in fact” and: (i) “must have a substan-
tially limiting effect upon the individual’s ability to perform his or her job” (“a
limitation is not substantial if it has only a trivial effect”); or (ii) “[t]he employee must
have put the employer on notice of the existence of an impairment, and medical docu-
mentation must establish a reasonable likelihood that engaging in job functions
without an accommodation would aggravate the impairment to the extent that it
would create a substantially limiting effect”).
84. Barry, supra note 31, at 278. R
85. 76 Fed. Reg. 16978 (Mar. 25, 2011).
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does it fall in the special category of failure to accommodate?86 These
are just a few examples of the kinds of dilemmas that could be raised,
on the cusp of antidiscrimination and accommodation.87 I admit I am
not optimistic that many courts will give a broad reading to discrimi-
nation that is statutorily distinguished from failure to
accommodate.88 On the contrary, this bifurcation of discrimination
types seems to fit nicely with Justice Kennedy’s sense that disability
inspires some non-ideal attitudes and actions from “us,” but “our”
newfangled forms of discrimination against disabled people are often
not bad enough to be actionable in law.
IV. MOVING THE LINE: TURNING BIDISABILITY INTO DISABILITY
Could we ask, about a concept . . . not so much ‘What does it
really mean?’ or ‘Who owns it and are they good or bad?’, but
‘What does it do?’—what does it make happen?—what . . .
does it make easier or harder for people of various kinds to
accomplish and think?
—Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick89
In principle, under the ADAAA, the category of disability has ex-
panded to include those who were, under the ADA, “not disabled
enough.”90 The EEOC calls this the “group whose ‘coverage has been
clarified’ under the ADAAA.”91 More generally, this liminal posi-
tion—of those who fell outside the rather narrow category of
disability that courts had read into the ADA—could be called bidis-
ability (or “bi-ability,” as Ruth Colker would have it).92 This category
86. Cf. Mary Anne Case, All the World’s the Men’s Room, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1655
(2007).
87. For more dilemmas on this cusp, see, for example, Jolls, supra note 75; Bagen- R
stos, supra note 24. R
88. One approach courts may take to reading “discriminate” narrowly is to insist
that plaintiffs identify “comparators” in order to prove that that the employer “dis-
criminated” (in the statute’s newly narrower meaning of that term) rather than failed
to accommodate.  For the definitive treatment of the comparator methodology, and a
discussion of its problems, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison,
120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011).
89. See Clare Hemmings, Bisexual Theoretical Perspectives: Emergent and Con-
tingent Relationships, in BI ACADEMIC INTERVENTION, THE BISEXUAL IMAGINARY:
REPRESENTATION, IDENTITY & DESIRE 1, 16 (1997) (quoting Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick,
‘Bi’, Queer Studies list, QSTUDY-L@UBVM.cc.buffalo.edu, Aug. 17, 1994: 15:49:34-
0400) (emphases removed). Sedgwick was writing about “a concept like bisexuality
that is gaining new currency.” Id. I thank Michael Boucai for bringing this quotation
to my attention.
90. Cheryl Anderson has called this group the “not impaired enough’ plaintiffs.”
Cheryl L. Anderson, “Deserving Disabilities”: Why the Definition of Disability Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act Should Be Revised To Eliminate the Substantial
Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L. REV. 83, 85 (2000).
91. 76 Fed. Reg. 16987 n.3 (Mar. 25, 2011).
92. Ruth Colker offered the first and most sustained treatment of a category in
between disabled and nondisabled as an explicit “bi” category akin to biracialism and
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is bidisabled in the sense that it lies between disabled and nondis-
abled, overlapping with both.
Normatively, there is no one right way to handle questions of line
drawing and differential treatment across the spectrum of disability.
Sometimes it seems sensible to draw finely honed distinctions be-
tween gradations of disability for legal purposes, while in other
contexts it may be best to provide common treatment for various de-
grees of disability, as cases from other jurisdictions suggest.93
Many of those who were bidisabled under the ADA will presuma-
bly be absorbed within the ADAAA’s broader disability definition.
Bidisability does not appear to have any sort of cultural identity—
unlike bisexual or biracial identity—but it is worth considering what
functions this category nonetheless might have served. Most notably,
I think that under the ADA before the recent amendments, the not-
disabled-enough group has been providing a kind of buffer zone be-
tween nondisabled and disabled.
Disability is a threatening category to many people because, un-
like a subordinated race or sex, anyone can fall into the category of
disabled at any time. As various scholars have written, the permea-
bility of a subordinated group does not necessarily lead to empathy
from outsiders; on the contrary, the possibility of falling into a subor-
dinated group can lead outsiders to fear group members and to
distance themselves from the category.94 This is the idea behind
homophobia: fear of the other in oneself makes one phobic of the
other. Writing about disability, Harlan Hahn has famously called
this the “existential anxiety” inspired by disabled others.95
In-between categories can sometimes provoke this kind of anxi-
ety to an even greater degree, because it is harder to distance oneself
from categories that share traits with both ends of a particular iden-
bisexuality. See RUTH COLKER, HYBRID (1996); Ruth Colker, Bi, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(1995). While “bidisability” and “bi-ability” are both evocative terms, to my ears bidis-
ability more clearly indicates the focus on disability. Because ability is the culturally
unmarked category, see infra text accompanying note 105, I think it’s harder for a R
reader to recognize that bi-abled refers to a category that is and is not disability,
rather than a term for the possession of two different abilities. Moreover, bidisability
avoids the hyphen and locates disability—rather than the dominant category—at the
center of the term.
93. In recent years, the European Court of Human Rights has been generating
some interesting case law involving those individuals disabled enough to be discrimi-
nated against (or at least treated differently) but not disabled enough to be protected
against discrimination (or at least not granted certain benefits reserved for the truly
disabled). The results yield no uniform vision of how interim degrees of disability
should be treated, and rightly so, I think. Compare, e.g., Glor v. Switzerland, No.
13444/04 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., Apr. 30, 2009), with Kiss v. Hungary, No. 38832/06
(Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., May 20, 2010).
94. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 353 (2000); Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy
and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004).
95. Harlan Hahn, Can Disability Be Beautiful?, 18 SOC. POL. 26, 27–29 (1988).
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tity spectrum. Kenji Yoshino has, for instance, argued in this vein
that bisexuality threatens both gays and straights, because both
groups are more comfortable thinking their positions are fixed and
opposite.96 The existence of bisexuality makes it much harder for peo-
ple to prove that they are simply straight or gay, because the fact of
desire in one direction does not disprove desire in the other
direction.97
Under this logic, one might think that the old ADA’s highlighting
of what I am calling the bidisabled would increase existential anxiety
about disability. But recall what the courts did with the bidisabled
under the ADA: classified them as “not disabled.” In the hands of the
courts, the broad group of positions between those “severely re-
stricted” by their impairments and those not so limited by their
impairments was declared to fall outside the definition of “disability”
under the statute. (I have sometimes thought, half seriously, that
courts so frequently dismissed cases at summary judgment by nar-
rowly defining disability because they preferred to declare plaintiffs
not to be disabled—as if judicial performativity could operate like an
evangelical preacher’s “You can walk!”—rather than judging disabled
plaintiffs to be unqualified to work.) By locating the boundaries of
“disability” around so narrow a group, and fixing a large group of
somewhat (but not sufficiently) restricted folks just outside the rubric
of disability, the courts created a kind of safe zone, a buffer between
disabled and nondisabled, which was legally declared to be the latter.
The ADAAA tries to eliminate, or at least shrink and shift, that
buffer zone. It aims to bring us closer to a world in which “[t]here is
no ‘us’ and ‘them.’”98 If the ADAAA succeeds in folding many of the
bidisabled into the legal category of disability, then we might also see
heightened existential anxiety and associated empathy failures. The
question will be how to turn the attitudinal consequences of an ex-
panded definition of “disability” in a more favorable direction—from
heightened anxiety to a better appreciation of disability law as a so-
cial insurance policy for everyone.
V. CODIFYING ASYMMETRY
There is a tradition [of saying] . . . in the acknowledgements
sections of academic books . . . that others, while they might
have contributed to the successful aspects of the project, are
not to be held accountable for a book’s “main defects[.]” From
where I sit . . . this strikes me as a tradition worth inverting.
96. See Yoshino, supra note 94. R
97. Id.
98. See Chai Feldblum, Kevin Barry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 187, 228 (2008) (quoting Chai Feldblum, testi-
mony before the Senate HELP Committee, Nov. 15, 2007).
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If there is anything disabled, queer, or crip about this book, it
has come from my collaborative work with those named
above, and many others. I take responsibility, however, for
the moments when crip energies and ideas are contained or
diluted in what follows, and I know that others will continue
to push the work of this book, and the movements that made
it possible, beyond those moments of containment.
—Robert McRuer99
The ADAAA more firmly establishes the ADA as what I have
called an “asymmetrical” statute—that is, a statute that protects
some groups along a particular axis and not others—in contrast to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is largely a “symmetri-
cal” statute, in that it protects everyone on the basis of some axis of
identity (such as race or sex).100 The ADAAA makes explicit that this
statutory regime will not tolerate so-called reverse discrimination
claims: “(g) CLAIMS OF NO DISABILITY.—Nothing in this Act shall
provide the basis for a claim by an individual without a disability
that the individual was subject to discrimination because of the indi-
vidual’s lack of disability.”101
Why is this possible for the ADA, when it is not for Title VII? An
asymmetrical approach is more of an antisubordination model than
an antidifferentiation (or anticlassification) model. An antisubordina-
tion model of antidiscrimination takes account of history and targets
interventions to the groups that have been subject to systematic sub-
ordination. By contrast, an antidifferentiation approach looks
skeptically upon any use of the protected classification, even if that
aim is to rectify that history of discrimination. Many scholars (and
more than one Supreme Court justice) have argued that an an-
tisubordination model for antidiscrimination efforts would be more
sensible for race and sex.102 So how do we have an explicit an-
tisubordination model for disability and not for race and sex?
99. ROBERT MCRUER, CRIP THEORY, at xv (2006).
100. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)
(race); Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)
(sex); see also Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness,
Hedonic Costs, and the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399, 464-65 (2006).
101. ADAAA § 12201(g). The provision was added in order to “avoid the potential
for reverse discrimination suits,” in light of the ADAAA’s broadening of the definition
of disability. See Barry, supra note 31, at 265 n.365. In addition, the ADAAA’s minor
changes to the way “discrimination” is defined in § 12112(a)—from prohibiting “dis-
criminat[ion] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability
of such individual” to prohibiting “discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual on
the basis of disability,” see 76 Fed. Reg. at 17005—might otherwise have left the stat-
ute open to claims of reverse discrimination.
102. This Essay is not making an argument for such an approach, which is a com-
plicated matter. For a provocative new treatment, see Michael Kavey, The
Unprotected Class (work in progress).
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Most obviously, there is no constitutional impediment to an
asymmetrical statute in the disability context. For better and worse,
disability does not have the constitutional problem presented by race
and sex, both of which are subject to heightened scrutiny, which the
Court has applied (nearly) symmetrically.103 But why would this ex-
plicit anti-reverse-discrimination provision not raise hackles, sink
the statute, or even get publicity? Why is no one worried about, for
example, the non-deaf person denied a job at a Deaf institution?104
I think the answer lies in the highly negative social status of dis-
ability, in at least three ways.  First, it has something to do with the
still unmarked status of those who are not disabled.105 To some ex-
tent, we have come to see men and whites as having a sex and a race,
respectively.106 True, those who are not men and who are not white
are marked to a greater degree; they are still not the norm for many
purposes. But it no longer seems strange that a white person could
claim he was discriminated against based on his whiteness.107
But the opposite of disability does not register as anything other
than fortunate, lucky, or normal, I think. (Or as “citizens” or just “us,”
in Justice Kennedy’s language.108) To refer to people as “disabled”
and “nondisabled” still sounds strange to many. I doubt many nondis-
abled people think of themselves as “nondisabled”; if they were asked
to list the identity categories they fall into, nondisabled would not
come high on the list, if it appeared at all. So to deny people claims on
the basis of this identity does not seem to violate any aspect of some-
one’s being.
Second, disability is still so widely regarded as an inferior status
that giving something to this group that no one else gets can go
largely unchallenged.  A nondisabled person who tried to claim the
benefits of a statute designed for people with disabilities would likely
face some stigma or opprobrium.109 True, some people complain that
103. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Olmstead v.
Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
104. Cf. Susan Kinzie, Nelson Hernandez & David A. Fahrenthold, Gallaudet
Board Ousts Fernandes, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2006 (describing the controversy over
Callaudet’s attempt to appoint a president who was, to some, not Deaf enough, be-
cause she learned ASL in her twenties, and the governing board’s ultimate decision to
revoke her appointment).
105. See, e.g., Michael Bérubé, Afterword: If I Should Live So Long, in DISABILITY
STUDIES: ENABLING THE HUMANITIES 337, 337 (Sharon L. Snyder, Brenda Jo Brueg-
geman & Rosemarie Garland-Thomson eds., 2002) (noting that the “default position”
is “to see people without disabilities as normal and to see that category of the normal,
like the category of whiteness, as unmarked”).
106. From the poetic to the satiric, see, for example, ROBERT BLY, IRON JOHN: A
BOOK ABOUT MEN (2004), and CHRISTIAN LANDER, STUFF WHITE PEOPLE LIKE (2008).
107. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658 (2009).
108. See supra note 78 (quoting Garrett). R
109. These moves to fake subordinated status to claim associated goodies are the
stuff of film comedies. Compare THE RINGER (20th Century Fox, 2006) (depicting
Johnny Knoxville as a cash-starved man who fakes an intellectual disability in order
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parents seek diagnoses to get goodies for their children in the educa-
tional context,110 but even if true, I think little of that has made it
into the adult world, in part because of the degree of stigma. So to
ban such claims does not injure any as-yet-identified group of
claimants.
Third, and relatedly, the degree of inferiority society assigns to
disability allows the category to escape the anxieties about a world
upside down that animate racial discourse.  Discussions of race dis-
crimination are haunted by the spectre of a someday or somewhere
world where the subordinated race(s) become dominant and begin to
persecute whites.111  I think the assumption that disability truly sig-
nals inferiority means that (almost) no one expects disabled people to
take over society and subordinate nondisabled people.112  And even in
such a takeover, the unconscious logic goes, the disabled people in
power would still see the superior job-related capacities of disabled
people, so disabled people wouldn’t face much discrimination.
Observing the ease of banning reverse discrimination claims in
the ADAAA highlights other manifestations of these resolutely nega-
tive attitudes to disability. For instance, the persistence of a clear
hierarchy of nondisabled over disabled also contributes to the fre-
quent omission of disability from corporate and academic “diversity”
initiatives. Some recent work makes the so-called business case for
hiring disabled workers and advertising to people with disabilities.113
And some of us have written about the benefits to workplace and soci-
ety of some accommodations requested by individual disabled
people.114 But however obvious they may be to disability “insid-
to try to claim prize money in the Special Olympics), with, e.g., SOUL MAN (Balcor/
Steve Tisch 1986) (portraying C. Thomas Howell as a rich white kid who poses as
African-American to claim a race-based scholarship when his father stopped support-
ing him).
110. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE (1997).
111. Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
112. A counter example would be Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s reading of Kazuo
Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go, and particularly the film adaptation, as dramatizing an
anxiety about a world upside down in which people with disabilities use nondisabled
people for their own grotesque purposes. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, “Habitable
Worlds: Eugenic Spaces and Democratic Spaces,” The Ethics of Disability Studies
Lecture Series, Columbia University (Feb 25, 2011).
113. See, e.g., CHARLES A. RILEY II, DISABILITY AND BUSINESS: BEST PRACTICES AND
STRATEGIES FOR INCLUSION (2006); see also Helen A. Schartz, Kevin M. Schartz, D.J.
Hendricks & Peter Blanck, Workplace Accommodations: Empirical Study of Current
Employers, 75 MISS. L.J. 917 (2006).
114. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accom-
modations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79 (2003); Emens, supra note 14. R
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ers,”115 these broader benefits of disability and accommodation are
frequently overlooked, including by courts, in striking ways.116
People who run diversity initiatives are (anecdotally) uncomfort-
able and awkward when asked why they have omitted disability (as
these initiatives often do). There is sometimes a general reluctance to
focus affirmative action efforts on anything other than race—a con-
cern that bringing in other groups waters down the attention that
needs to be bestowed on race. But even where diversity initiatives go
further than race, they usually skip disability.
Lennard Davis has recently argued that the era of the normal is
over, and diversity is the new normal, except for disability. He says
that disability is not part of our new cultural celebration of diver-
sity—that impairment is the area where we still cling to a medical
model and denigrate difference.117 I am skeptical that our cultural
affinity for normality is ending—by way of example, I might ask,
what fraction of America, particularly outside academia but even
within it, would consider it a compliment to be called “weird”? But I
agree with Davis that a thin conception of diversity circulates in the
contemporary United States as part of an affirmative vision of iden-
tity and humanity, and I agree that that affirmative vision largely
excludes disability.
Diversity conceives integration as affirming difference. In con-
trast to our standard antisubordination story of integration, which
focuses on the harms to certain groups of historical exclusion and
denigration, a diversity story focuses on the future gains to society of
the rich cultural contributions of those with varied identities.118 A
115. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012) (citing sources from disability “insiders” expressing annoyance at the undue
appreciation given to the benefits of accommodations to nondisabled people, in the
context of an article more broadly distinguishing between “inside” and “outside” per-
spectives on disability).
116. For instance, in the employment domain, courts fail to notice the second- and
third-party benefits of accommodation, even while acknowledging third-party costs in
a cost-benefit balancing test of their own design. See Emens, supra note 14. R
117. Lennard Davis, “The End of Normal: Multiculturalism, Disability & Diver-
sity,” The Ethics of Disability Studies Speaker Series, put on by the Columbia
University Department of English & Comparative Literature, the Center for the Crit-
ical Analysis of Social Difference, the Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, and the
Center for American Studies (Apr. 1, 2011); see also Lennard J. Davis, Why Is Disabil-
ity Missing from the Discourse on Diversity?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 25, 2011,
available at http://chronicle.com/article/Why-Is-Disability-Missing-From/129088/.
118. A range of work could be cited on the various benefits of various disabilities.
One colorful example comes from Temple Grandin: “ ‘If you got rid of all the autism
genetics, you’d get rid of scientists, musicians, mathematicians.  Some guy with high-
functioning Asperger’s developed the first stone spear; it wasn’t developed by the so-
cial ones yakking around the campfire.’” See Andrew Solomon, The Autism Rights
Movement, N.Y. MAG., May 25, 2008, available at http://nymag.com/news/features/
47225/ (quoting Temple Grandin); see also Kevin M. Barry, Gray Matters: Autism,
Impairment, and the End of Binaries, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (dis-
cussing, inter alia, the growing neurodiversity movement); see also Daniela Caruso,
Autism in the U.S.: Social Movement and Legal Change, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 483,
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diversity narrative can of course be criticized on numerous grounds—
for instance, for stereotyping or reifying certain notions of identity,119
or for viewing some people as “more diverse” than others and treating
those diverse others as valuable more for the way they make class-
rooms and workplaces colorful for the real (e.g., white, normal)
participants than for the pursuit of their own interests.
While these debates over the merits of a diversity approach to
discrimination are interesting, they are tangential to this essay. My
aim here is not to argue for (or against) a diversity agenda, but rather
to use disability’s relative absence from that agenda to help limn con-
temporary U.S. conceptions of disability.
At a talk I gave recently, a student raised an example that helps
to illustrate disability’s position in relation to diversity thinking.120
The student had apparently not thought much about disability in the
past, but our discussion that day made her think about the cultural
houses at her undergraduate college. These residential sites were or-
ganized around people’s interests in, for instance, the environment or
music. The African-American House was somewhat controversial,
but it was framed around a focus on African-American history, which
opened it up to people who were not themselves African-American,
although most residents were. The student posited the possibility of a
“Disability House,” and immediately concluded that such a house
would be even more controversial than the African-American House,
though she was not entirely sure why.
I think the reaction the student anticipated to a Disability
House—and the absence of Disability Houses—is related to the neg-
lect of disability in diversity initiatives, and to the ADAAA’s easy
inclusion of a ban on reverse discrimination suits. Disability is rarely
understood as a positive state or identity with social or cultural bene-
fits to its bearers or those around them. This perspective lacks any
appreciation of the idea of crip culture or the recent explosion of disa-
bility-related arts.121 We are still close enough to an era of
widespread institutionalization of people with physical as well as
mental disabilities, such that a house for people with disabilities
could hardly be understood as anything other than the product of ex-
clusion or even warehousing.122 (And as another student rightly
485–87, 494–501 (2010) (analyzing the politics of neurodiversity in the context of the
broader social movement surrounding autism).
119. See, e.g., RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE (2005).
120. Discussion with the Columbia Law Women’s Association on Intimate Discrim-
ination (Mar. 23, 2011).
121. See, e.g., SIMI LINTON, MY BODY POLITIC, and the film in progress based on
Linton’s memoir, Invitation to Dance; films like Murderball; The DISthis film series,
http://disthis.org/; The GIMP Project, http://www.thegimpproject.com/gimp/.
122. One might say that the problem with Disability House is that disabilities are
so diverse; they are indeed diverse, but a Blind House seems just as likely to raise
these concerns.
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pointed out, “disability houses” of course occur all the time on cam-
puses and elsewhere, when only one building or part of an institution
is accessible.) But the reason a Disability House sounds troubling to
most is not just historical associations. Rather, the Disability House
is inconceivable as an affirmative story because mainstream culture
has so little sense that people with disabilities could want to be to-
gether—much less that nondisabled people could affirmatively seek
out a disability-centered context.
U.S. law on integration in the context of “special education” and
of community-based living for people with mental disabilities reflects
and reinforces this understanding. Statutes and cases in these areas
explicitly focus on the extent to which people with disabilities are in-
teracting with people without disabilities.123 That is, environments
are better or worse depending on how much contact they offer with
nondisabled people.124 There are important historical reasons for this
focus—even if some of the normative presuppositions are being de-
bated in particular areas125—but the language in these cases is
jarring if one begins to question, even for a moment, the presumed
desirability of interacting with nondisabled people.126 Imagine a sim-
ilar discussion about racial integration rather than disability
integration—for instance, a case that repeatedly and explicitly
stressed how one environment was superior because of how much
contact it offered with white people. (Of course this has effectively
123. See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 84 Stat. 175, as
amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (requiring that participating states establish “proce-
dures to assure that[,] . . . [t]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with
disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not disabled”); Disability Advo-
cates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F.Supp.2d 184, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (saying repeatedly, in
a judgment that adult homes run by the state of New York violate the integration
mandate of Title II of the ADA and Olmstead, that these “Adult Homes limit the de-
velopment of relationships with people who do not have disabilities”).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., RUTH COLKER, WHEN IS SEPARATE UNEQUAL?: A DISABILITY PERSPEC-
TIVE (2009).
126. Although parents of nondisabled children do sometimes want their children in
special classroom settings with disabled children, this seems to be because of the en-
hanced resources and better student-teacher ratios, rather than a sense that
interacting with disabled children will benefit their nondisabled children. See, e.g.,
Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1415, 1462 n.264 (2007); Emens, supra note 14, at 866 n.69. Relatedly, for an R
incisive theoretical take on the difference between inclusion and access, see Tobin
Siebers, Disability Studies and the Future of Identity Politics, in DISABILITY THEORY
70, 93–94 (2008) (“How might disability studies revise, for instance, the concept of
exclusion? . . . Enlightenment philosophy was eager to right the wrong of exclusionary
behavior, and its objective, inherited by every subsequent age, involves naming who is
being excluded by whom and insisting on inclusion . . . . Here is where disability
studies might a sea change by asking that the inclusion-exclusion binary be recon-
ceived in terms of accessiblity and inaccessibility . . . . In short, all worlds should be
accessible to everyone, but it is up to individuals to decide whether they will enter
those worlds.”).
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been the implication of some of our racial integration efforts and
decisions.)
What is striking, I think, once one considers the possibility of
disability as something that people (disabled or nondisabled) could be
drawn to—for community, culture, or concepts—is that the discus-
sions of integration in the disability context are not framed, even
superficially, in terms of what nondisabled and disabled offer each
other. Rather, benefits are almost always seen as traveling one
way—from nondisabled to disabled. In this light, why would volun-
tary efforts to diversify an institution incorporate disability? Why
would an institution choose to seek out people who would bring costs
and no benefits? And how could a university have a Disability House
that students—disabled and even nondisabled—would choose to join?
They wouldn’t. No one would seek to affiliate with this group, the
story goes, and so eliminating the possibility of lawsuits brought by
nondisabled people who feel they were discriminated against for not
being disabled raises no hackles, and passed into law unnoticed.
CONCLUSION
every built thing has its unmeant purpose . . .
[e]very built thing with its unmeant
meaning  unmet purpose
every unbuilt thing
—Adrienne Rich127
When I heard Adrienne Rich read these lines in October of 2007,
I was finishing an article on the unintended benefits of workplace
accommodations under the ADA.128 “Unmeant purpose” resonated
deeply with my sense of benefits developed for one use and exapted to
another.129 The built world was my frequent focus in that article, in
fact and metaphor.
These lines now reach further. The “unmet purpose” of the ADA
has been my subject here; indeed, it is the subject of the ADAAA.
Metaphors of the built environment circulate always in discussions of
the ADA, both challenging and constraining our thinking about disa-
127. Adrienne Rich, Powers of Recuperation, 8 A PUBLIC SPACE (2007), available at
http://www.apublicspace.org/poetry/powers_of_recuperation.html.
128. Emens, supra note 14 (identifying ways that changes to the workplace to ac- R
commodate individual workers with disabilities can benefit other workers, disabled
and nondisabled, depending upon their design, and tracing the courts’ lack of appreci-
ation of these potential benefits); cf. 76 Fed. Reg. 16997-98 (Mar. 25, 2011)
(acknowledging these and other direct and indirect benefits of accommodation).
129. See Emens, supra note 14, at 855 (explaining that the “broader uses of disabil- R
ity-related innovations might be analogized to what evolutionary theorists call
exaptations, which are traits (i.e., aptations, the progress-neutral variation on the
term adaptation) that emerge for one purpose and then turn out to be useful for an-
other purpose” (citation omitted)).
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bility. And in this Essay the broader benefits at issue extend beyond
the workplace and beyond accommodations. Our inquiry now reaches
towards the benefits of disability per se, for diversity efforts or an-
tidiscrimination concepts, through the possibility of shifting
attitudes. What lies ahead, in law and theory, is only every unbuilt
thing.
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